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Abstract
One aspect of human commonsense reasoning is the ability to make presump-
tions about daily experiences, activities and social interactions with others. We
propose a new commonsense reasoning benchmark where the task is to uncover
commonsense presumptions implied by imprecisely stated natural language com-
mands in the form of if-then-because statements. For example, in the command
“If it snows at night then wake me up early because I don’t want to be late for work”
the speaker relies on commonsense reasoning of the listener to infer the implicit
presumption that it must snow enough to cause traffic slowdowns. Such if-then-
because commands are particularly important when users instruct conversational
agents. We release a benchmark data set for this task, collected from humans and
annotated with commonsense presumptions. We develop a neuro-symbolic theo-
rem prover that extracts multi-hop reasoning chains and apply it to this problem.
We further develop an interactive conversational framework that evokes common-
sense knowledge from humans for completing reasoning chains.
1 Introduction
Despite the remarkable success of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning in the last few
decades, commonsense reasoning remains an unsolved problem at the heart of AI [1–3]. Common
sense allows us humans to engage in conversations with one another and to convey our thoughts
efficiently, without the need to specify much detail [4]. For example, if Alice asks Bob to “wake her
up early whenever it snows at night” so that she can get to work on time, Alice assumes that Bob
will wake her up only if it snows enough to cause traffic slowdowns, and only if it is a working day.
Alice does not explicitly state these conditions since Bob makes such presumptions without much
effort thanks to his common sense. A study, in which we collected if-then commands from human
subjects, revealed that humans often under-specify conditions in their statements; perhaps because
they are used to speaking with other humans who possess the common sense needed to infer their
more specific intent by making presumptions about their statement. The inability to make these
presumptions is one of the main reasons why it is challenging for computers to engage in natural
sounding conversations with humans.
In an attempt to enable this, we propose a new commonsense reasoning benchmark where the task
is to infer commonsense presumptions in commands of the form “If state holds Then perform
action Because I want to achieve goal .” The reason for including the “because” clause in the
commands is that some presumptions are ambiguous without knowing the user’s purpose, or goal.
For instance, if Alice’s goal in the above example was to see snow for the first time, Bob would have
presumed that even a snow flurry would be excuse enough to wake her up. Since humans frequently
omit details when stating such commands, a computer possessing common sense should be able
Table 1: Statistics of if-then-because commands collected from a pool of human subjects. The table
shows four distinct types of because-clauses we found, the count of commands of each type, ex-
amples of each and their corresponding commonsense presumption annotations. Restricted domain
includes commands whose state is limited to checking email, calendar, maps, alarms, and weather.
Everyday domain includes commands concerning more general day-to-day activities. Annotations
are tuples of (index, presumption) where index shows the starting word index of where the miss-
ing presumption should be in the command - highlighted with a red arrow. Index starts at 0 and is
calculated for the original command.
Domain
if
clause
then
clause
because
clause Example
Annotation:
Commonsense Presumptions Count
Restricted domain state action goal
If it’s going to rain in the afternoon ( ·
↓
)
then remind me to bring an umbrella ( ·
↓
)
because I want to remain dry
(8, and I am outside)
(15, before I leave the house)
76
Restricted domain state action anti-goal
If I have an upcoming bill payment ( ·
↓
)
then remind me to pay it ( ·
↓
)
because I don’t want to pay a late fee
(7, in the next few days)
(13, before the bill payment deadline)
3
Restricted domain state action modifier
If my flight ( ·
↓
) is from 2am to 4am
then book me a supershuttle ( ·
↓
)
because it will be difficult to find ubers.
(3, take off time)
(13, for 2 hours before my flight take off time)
2
Restricted domain state action conjunction
If I receive emails about sales on basketball shoes ( ·
↓
)
then let me know ( ·
↓
)
because I need them and I want to save money.
(9, my size)
(13, there is a sale)
2
SUM 83
Everyday domain state action goal
If there is an upcoming election ( ·
↓
)
then remind me to register ( ·
↓
) and vote ( ·
↓
)
because I want my voice to be heard.
(6, in the next few months)
(6, and I am eligible to vote)
(11, to vote), (13, in the election)
55
Everyday domain state action anti-goal
If it’s been two weeks since my last call with my mentee
and I don’t have an upcoming appointment with her ( ·
↓
)
then remind me to send her an email ( ·
↓
)
because we forgot to schedule our next chat
(21, in the next few days)
(29, to schedule our next appointment)
4
Everyday domain state action modifier
If I have difficulty sleeping ( ·
↓
)
then play a lullaby
because it soothes me.
(5, at night) 12
Everyday domain state action conjunction
If the power goes out ( ·
↓
)
then when it comes back on remind me to restart the house furnace
because it doesn’t come back on by itself and I want to stay warm
(5, in the Winter) 6
SUM 77
to infer the hidden presumptions; that is, the additional unstated conditions on the If and/or Then
portion of the command (refer to Tab. 1 to see some examples).
We propose an approach that infers such missing presumptions, by extracting a chain of reason-
ing that shows how the commanded actionwill achieve the desired goalwhen the state holds.
Whenever any additional reasoning steps appear in this reasoning chain, they are output by our sys-
tem as assumed implicit presumptions associated with the command. For our reasoning method we
propose a neuro-symbolic interactive, conversational approach, in which the computer combines its
own common sense knowledge with conversationally evoked knowledge provided by a human user.
The reasoning chain is extracted using our neuro-symbolic theorem prover that learns sub-symbolic
representations (embeddings) for logical statements, making it robust to variations of natural lan-
guage encountered in a conversational interaction setting.
Contributions We have three main contributions. 1) We propose a benchmark task for common-
sense reasoning and release a data set containing if-then-because commands, annotated with com-
monsense presumptions. 2) We present a system called CORGI (COmmonsense ReasoninG by
Instruction) that performs soft logical inference. We propose a neuro-symbolic theorem prover and
apply it to extract a multi-hop reasoning chain that reveals commonsense presumptions. 3) We equip
CORGI with a conversational interaction mechanism that enables it to collect just-in-time common-
sense knowledge from humans. Our user-study shows (a) the plausibility of relying on humans
to evoke commonsense knowledge and (b) the effectiveness of our theorem prover, enabling us to
extract reasoning chains for up to 45% of the studied tasks1.
Related Work The literature on commonsense reasoning dates back to the very beginning of
the field of AI [2, 5, 6] and is studied in several contexts. One aspect focuses on building a large
knowledge base (KB) of commonsense facts. Projects like CYC [7], ConceptNet [8,9] and ATOMIC
[10, 11] are examples of such KBs (see [2] for a comprehensive list). Recently, [12] proposed
COMET, a generative model trained on ConceptNet and ATOMIC, that generates commonsense
facts. These KBs provide background knowledge for tasks requiring common sense. However, it
is known that knowledge bases are incomplete, and most have ambiguities and inconsistencies [2]
that must be clarified for particular reasoning tasks. Therefore, we argue that reasoning engines
can benefit greatly from a conversational interaction strategy to ask humans about their missing
1Our code and data are publicly available here https://github.com/ForoughA/CORGI
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or inconsistent knowledge. Closest in nature to this proposal is the work by Hixon et al., [13] on
relation extraction through conversation for question answering. The advent of intelligent agents and
advancements in natural language processing have given learning from conversational interactions
a good momentum in the last few years [14–22].
A current challenge in commonsense reasoning is lack of benchmarks [2]. Benchmark tasks in
commonsense reasoning include the Winograd Schema Challenge (WSC) [1], its variations [23],
and its recently scaled up counterpart, Winogrande [3] ; ROCStories [24], COPA [25], and ART [26],
where the task is to choose a plausible outcome, cause or explanation for an input scenario. Most
of these benchmarks have a multiple choice design format. However, in the real world the computer
is usually not given multiple choice questions. None of these benchmarks targets the extraction of
unspoken details in a natural language statement, which is a challenging task for computers known
since the 1970’s [4].
CORGI has a neuro-symbolic logic theorem prover. Neuro-symbolic systems are hybrid models
that leverage the robustness of connectionist methods and the soundness of symbolic reasoning to
effectively integrate learning and reasoning [27, 28]. They have shown promise in different areas of
logical reasoning ranging from classical logic to propositional logic, probabilistic logic, abductive
logic, and inductive logic [29–34]. To the best of our knowledge, neuro-symbolic solutions for com-
monsense reasoning have not been proposed before. Examples of commonsense reasoning engines
are: AnalogySpace [35, 36] that uses dimensionality reduction, and [6] that uses the event calculus
formal language. TensorLog [37] converts a first-order logical database into a factor graph and pro-
poses a differentiable strategy for belief propagation over the graph. DeepProbLog [30] developed
a probabilistic logic programming language that is suitable for applications containing categorical
variables. Contrary to our approach, both these methods do not learn embeddings for logical rules
that are needed to make CORGI robust to natural language variations. Therefore, we propose an end-
to-end differentiable solution that uses a Prolog [38] proof trace to learn rule embeddings from data.
Our proposal is closest to the neural programmer interpreter [39] that uses the trace of algorithms
such as addition and sort to learn their execution. The use of Prolog for performing multi-hop logi-
cal reasoning has been studied in [40,41]. These methods perform Inductive Logic Programming to
learn rules from data, and are not applicable to our problem. DeepLogic [42] and [43,44] also learn
representations for logical rules using neural networks. Very recently, transformers were used for
temporal logic [45] and to do multi-hop reasoning [46] using logical facts and rules stated in natural
language. A purely connectionist approach to reasoning suffers from some limitations. For example,
the input token size limit of transformers restricts [46] to small knowledge bases. Moreover, gener-
alizing to arbitrary number of variables or an arbitrary inference depth is not trivial for them. Since
symbolic reasoning can inherently handle all these challenges, a hybrid approach to reasoning takes
the burden of handling them off of the neural component.
2 Proposed Commonsense Reasoning Benchmark
The benchmark task that we propose in this work is that of uncovering hidden commonsense pre-
sumptions given an input if-then-because command. Formally, the commands follow the general
format “if 〈state holds〉 then 〈perform action〉 because 〈I want to achieve goal〉”. We refer to the
if -clause as the state , the then-clause as the action and the because-clause as the goal . These
natural language commands were collected from a pool of human subjects (more details in the Ap-
pendix). The data is annotated with unspoken commonsense presumptions by a team of annotators.
Tab. 1 shows the statistics of the data and annotated examples from the data. We collected two
sets of if-then-because commands. The first set contains 83 commands targeted at a state that can
be observed by a computer/mobile phone (which is checking emails, calendar, maps, alarms, and
weather). The second set contains 77 commands whose state is about day-to-day events and activi-
ties. 81% of the commands over both sets qualify as “if 〈 state 〉 then 〈 action 〉 because 〈 goal 〉”.
The remaining 19% differ in the categorization of the because-clause (see Tab. 1); common alter-
nate clause types included anti-goals (“...because I don’t want to be late”), modifications of the state
or action (“... because it will be difficult to find an Uber”), or conjunctions including at least one
non-goal type. Note that we did not instruct the subjects to give us data from these categories, rather
we uncovered them after data collection. Note that commonsense benchmarks such as the Winograd
Schema Challenge [1] included a similar number of examples (100) when first introduced [23].
Lastly, after collecting the data we discovered that the if-then-because commands given by humans
can be categorized into several different logic templates. The discovered logic templates are given
in Table 5 in the Appendix. Our neuro-symbolic theorem prover uses a general reasoning strategy
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input: If 〈state 〉 then 〈action 〉 because 〈goal 〉
Parse Statement:
S(X)← state
A(Y )← action
G(Z)← goal
Is G in K?
i > n?
Ask the user for more
informationG′(Z).
i = i+ 1
goalStack.push(G(Z))
G(Z) = G′(Z)
Fail
goalStack
empty?
Neuro-Symbolic
Theorem Prover:
ProveG(Z)
Add a new rule to K
goalStack.top() ⊢ G(Z)
G(Z) = goalStack.pop()
knowledge base update loop
Is there a
proof for
G(Z)?
discard the rules added
in the knowledge base
update loop
Rule and Variable
embeddings
Fail
Does the
proof contain
S(X) and
A(Y )?
Succeed
proof
Y
N
Y
N
user feedback loop
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Figure 1: CORGI’s flowchart. The input is an if-then-because command e.g., “if it snows
tonight then wake me up early because I want to get to work on time”. The input is parsed
into its logical form representation (for the prev example, S(X) = weather(snow, Precipita-
tion)). If CORGI succeeds, it outputs a proof tree for the because-clause or goal (parsed into
G(Z)=get(i,work,on_time)). The output proof tree contains commonsense presumptions for the
input statement (Fig 2 shows an example). If the predicate G does not exist in the knowledge base,
K, (Is G in K?), we have missing knowledge and cannot find a proof. Therefore, we extract it from
a human in the user feedback loop. At the heart of CORGI is a neuro-symbolic theorem prover that
learns rule and variable embeddings to perform a proof (Alg.1). goalStack and the loop variable i
are initialized to empty and 0 respectively, and n = 3. italic text in the figure represents descriptions
that are referred to in the main text.
that can address all reasoning templates. However, in an extended discussion in the Appendix, we
explain how a reasoning system, including ours, could potentially benefit from these logic templates.
3 Method
Background and notation The system’s commonsense knowledge is a KB, denoted K, pro-
grammed in a Prolog-like syntax. We have developed a modified version of Prolog, which has
been augmented to support several special features (types, soft-matched predicates and atoms, etc).
Prolog [38] is a declarative logic programming language that consists of a set of predicates whose ar-
guments are atoms, variables or predicates. A predicate is defined by a set of rules (Head :− Body.)
and facts (Head.), where Head is a predicate, Body is a conjuction of predicates, and :− is logical
implication. We use the notation S(X), A(Y ) andG(Z) to represent the logical form of the state ,
action and goal , respectively where S, A andG are predicate names andX,Y and Z indicate the
list of arguments of each predicate. For example, for goal=“I want to get to work on time”, we
haveG(Z) =get(i, work, on_time). Prolog can be used to logically “prove” a query (e.g., to prove
G(Z)) using the backward chaining algorithm (see the Appendix - Prolog Background).
3.1 CORGI: COmmonsense Reasoning by Instruction
CORGI takes as input a natural language command of the form “if 〈state 〉 then 〈action 〉 because
〈goal 〉” and infers commonsense presumptions by extracting a chain of commonsense knowledge
that explains how the commanded action achieves the goalwhen the state holds. For example
from a high level, for the command in Fig. 2 CORGI outputs (1) if it snows more than two inches,
then there will be traffic, (2) if there is traffic, then my commute time to work increases, (3) if my
commute time to work increases then I need to leave the house earlier to ensure I get to work on time
(4) if I wake up earlier then I will leave the house earlier. Formally, this reasoning chain is a proof
tree (proof trace) shown in Fig.2. As shown, the proof tree includes the commonsense presumptions.
CORGI’s architecture is depicted in Figure 1. In the first step, the if-then-because command goes
through a parser that extracts the state , action and goal from it and converts them to their logical
form representations S(X), A(Y ) and G(Z), respectively. For example, the action “wake me up
early” is converted to wake(me, early). The parser is presented in the Appendix (Sec. Parsing).
The proof trace is obtained by finding a proof for G(Z), using K and the context of the input
if-then-because command. In other words, S(X) ∩ A(Y ) ∩ K → G(Z). One challenge is that
even the largest knowledge bases gathered to date are incomplete, making it virtually infeasible to
prove an arbitrary input G(Z). Therefore, CORGI is equipped with a conversational interaction
strategy which enables it to prove a query by combining its own commonsense knowledge with
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get(Person, ToPlace, on_time)t = 0
arrive(Person, , , ToPlace, ArriveAt)t = 1
ready(Person, LeaveAt, PrepTime)t = 2
alarm(Perosn, Time)t = 3
alarm(i,8)t = 4
LeaveAt = Time + PrepTime.t = 5
commute(Person, FromPlace,
ToPlace, With, CommuteTime)
t = 6
commute(i, home, work, car, 1)t = 7
traffic(LeaveAt, ToPlace, With,
TrTime)
t = 8
weather(snow, Precipitation)t = 9 Precipitation >= 2t = 10 TrTime = 1t = 11
ArriveAt = LeaveAt +
CommuteTime + TrTime
t = 12
calendarEntry(Person, ToPlace, ArriveAt)t = 13
calendarEntry(i, work, 9)t = 14
Figure 2: Sample proof tree for the because-clause of the statement: “If it snows tonight then
wake me up early because I want to get to work on time”. Proof traversal is depth-first from
left to right (t gives the order). Each node in the tree indicates a rule’s head, and its chil-
dren indicate the rule’s body. For example, the nodes highlighted in green indicate the rule
ready(Person,LeaveAt,PrepTime) :− alarm(Person, Time) ∧ LeaveAt = Time+PrepTime. The
goalwe want to prove, G(Z)=get(Person, ToPlace, on_time), is in the tree’s root. If a proof is
successful, the variables in G(Z) get grounded (here Person and ToPlace are grounded to i and
work, respectively). The highlighted orange nodes are the uncovered commonsense presumptions.
conversationally evoked knowledge provided by a human user in response to a question fromCORGI
(user feedback loop in Fig.1). There are 4 possible scenarios that could occur when designing such
a conversational knowledge extraction strategy.
A The user understands the question, but does not know the answer.
B The user misunderstands the question and responds with an undesired answer.
C The user understands the question and provides a correct answer, but the system fails to
understand the user due to:
C.1 limitations of natural language understanding.
C.2 variations in natural language, which result in misalignment of the data schema in the
knowledge base and the data schema in the user’s mind.
D The user understands the questions and provides the correct answer and the system success-
fully parses and understands it.
CORGI’s different components are designed such that they address the above challenges, as ex-
plained below. Since our benchmark data set deals with day-to-day activities, it is unlikely for sce-
narioA to occur. If the task required more specific domain knowledge,A could have been addressed
by choosing a pool of domain experts. Scenario B is addressed by asking informative questions
from users. Scenario C.1 is addressed by trying to extract small chunks of knowledge from the
users piece-by-piece. Specifically, the choice of what to ask the user in the user feedback loop is
deterministically computed from the user’s goal . The first step is to ask how to achieve the user’s
stated goal , and CORGI expects an answer that gives a sub-goal . In the next step, CORGI asks
how to achieve the sub-goal the user just mentioned. The reason for this piece-by-piece knowledge
extraction is to ensure that the language understanding component can correctly parse the user’s re-
sponse. CORGI then adds the extracted knowledge from the user to K in the knowledge update loop
shown in Fig.1. Missing knowledge outside this goal /sub-goalpath is not handled, although it is
an interesting future direction. Moreover, the model is user specific and the knowledge extracted
from different users are not shared among them. Sharing knowledge raises interesting privacy issues
and requires handling personalized conflicts and falls out of the scope of our current study.
Scenario C.2, caused by the variations of natural language, results in semantically similar statements
to get mapped into different logical forms, which is unwanted. For example, “make sure I am
awake early morning” vs. “wake me up early morning” will be parsed into different logical forms
awake(i,early_morning) andwake(me, early_morning), respectively although they are semantically
similar. This mismatch prevents a logical proof from succeeding since the proof strategy relies on
exact match in the unification operation (see Appendix). This is addressed by our neuro-symbolic
theorem prover (Fig.1) that learns vector representations (embeddings) for logical rules and variables
and uses them to perform a logical proof through soft unification. If the theorem prover can prove
the user’s goal , G(Z), CORGI outputs the proof trace (Fig.2) returned by its theorem prover and
succeeds. In the next section, we explain our theorem prover in detail. We revisit scenarios A −D
in detail in the discussion section and show real examples from our user study.
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4 Neuro-Symbolic Theorem Proving
Our Neuro-Symbolic theorem prover is a neural modification of backward chaining and uses the
vector similarity between rule and variable embeddings for unification. In order to learn these
embeddings, our theorem prover learns a general proving strategy by training on proof traces of
successful proofs. From a high level, for a given query our model maximizes the probability of
choosing the correct rule to pick in each step of the backward chaining algorithm. This proposal is
an adaptation of Reed et al.’s Neural Programmer-Interpreter [39] that learns to execute algorithms
such as addition and sort, by training on their execution trace.
In what follows, we represent scalars with lowercase letters, vectors with bold lowercase letters
and matrices with bold uppercase letters. Mrule ∈ Rn1×m1 denotes the embedding matrix for the
rules and facts, where n1 is the number of rules and facts and m1 is the embedding dimension.
Mvar ∈ Rn2×m2 denotes the variable embeddingmatrix, where n2 is the number of all the atoms and
variables in the knowledge base andm2 is the variable embedding dimension. Our knowledge base is
type coerced, therefore the variable names are associated with their types (e.g., alarm(Person,Time))
Learning The model’s core consists of an LSTM network whose hidden state indicates the next
rule in the proof trace and a proof termination probability, given a query as input. The model has a
feed forward network that makes variable binding decisions. The model’s training is fully supervised
by the proof trace of a query given in a depth-first-traversal order from left to right (Fig. 2). The
trace is sequentially input to the model in the traversal order as explained in what follows. In step
t ∈ [0, T ] of the proof, the model’s input is ǫinpt =
(
qt, rt, (v
1
t , . . . ,v
ℓ
t)
)
and T is the total number
of proof steps. qt is the query’s embedding and is computed by feeding the predicate name of the
query into a character RNN. rt is the concatenated embeddings of the rules in the parent and the left
sister nodes in the proof trace, looked up fromMrule. For example in Fig.2, q3 represents the node
at proof step t = 3, r3 represents the rule highlighted in green (parent rule), and r4 represents the
fact alarm(i, 8). The reason for including the left sister node in rt is that the proof is conducted in
a left-to-right depth first order. Therefore, the decision of what next rule to choose in each node is
dependent on both the left sisters and the parent (e.g. the parent and the left sisters of the node at
step t = 8 in Fig. 2 are the rules at nodes t = 1, t = 2, and t = 6, respectively). The arguments
of the query are presented in (v1t , . . . ,v
ℓ
t) where ℓ is the arity of the query predicate. For example,
v13 in Fig 2 is the embedding of the variable Person. Each v
i
t for i ∈ [0, ℓ], is looked up from the
embedding matrix Mvar. The output of the model in step t is ǫoutt =
(
ct, rt+1, (v
1
t+1, . . . ,v
ℓ
t+1))
and is computed through the following equations
st = fenc(qt, ), ht = flstm(st, rt,ht−1), (1)
ct = fend(ht), rt+1 = frule(ht), v
i
t+1 = fvar(v
i
t), (2)
where vit+1 is a probability vector over all the variables and atoms for the i
th argument, rt+1 is a
probability vector over all the rules and facts and ct is a scalar probability of terminating the proof
at step t. fenc, fend, frule and fvar are feed forward networks with two fully connected layers, and
flstm is an LSTM network. The trainable parameters of the model are the parameters of the feed
forward neural networks, the LSTM network, the character RNN that embeds qt and the rule and
variable embedding matricesMrule andMvar.
Our model is trained end-to-end. In order to train the model parameters and the embeddings, we
maximize the log likelihood probability given below
θ
∗ = argmax θ
∑
ǫout,ǫin
log(P (ǫout|ǫin; θ)), (3)
where the summation is over all the proof traces in the training set and θ is the trainable parameters
of the model. We have
log(P (ǫout|ǫin; θ)) =
T∑
t=1
logP (ǫoutt |ǫ
in
1 . . . ǫ
in
t−1; θ) (4)
logP (ǫoutt |ǫ
in
1 . . . ǫ
in
t−1; θ) = logP (ǫ
out
t |ǫ
in
t−1; θ)
= logP (ct|ht) + logP (rt+1|ht) + log
∑
i
P (vit+1|v
i
t). (5)
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Table 2: percentage of successful rea-
soning tasks for different user types. In
no-feedback, user responses are not con-
sidered in the proof attempt. in soft
unification CORGI uses our proposed
neuro-symbolic theorem prover. In the
Oracle scenario, the theorem prover has
access to oracle embeddings and soft
unification is 100% accurate.
CORGI variations Novice User Expert User
No-feedback 0% 0%
Soft unification 15.61% 35.00%
Oracle unification 21.62% 45.71%
Table 3:
Sample dialogs of 2 novice users in our study.
CORGI’s responses are noted in italics.
Successful task
If it’s going to rain in the afternoon then remind me to bring an umbrella because I want to remain dry.
How do I know if “I remain dry”?
If I have my umbrella.
How do I know if “I have my umbrella”?
If you remind me to bring an umbrella.
Okay, I will perform “remind me to bring an umbrella” in order to achieve “I remain dry”.
Failed task
If it’s going to rain in the afternoon then remind me to bring an umbrella because I want to remain dry.
How do I know if “I remain dry”?
If I have my umbrella.
How do I know if “I have my umbrella”?
If it’s in my office.
How do I know if “it’s in my office”?
...
Where the probabilities in Equation (5) are given in Equations (2). The inference algorithm for
porving is given in the Appendix, section Inference.
5 Experiment Design
The knowledge base, K, used for all experiments is a small handcrafted set of commonsense knowl-
edge. See Tab.6 in the Appendix for examples. K includes general information about time, restricted-
domains such as setting alarms and notifications, emails, and so on, as well as commonsense knowl-
edge about day-to-day activities. K contains a total of 228 facts and rules. Among these, there are
189 everyday-domain and 39 restricted domain facts and rules. We observed that most of the if-then-
because commands require everyday-domain knowledge for reasoning, even if they are restricted-
domain commands (see Table 3 for example).
Our Neuro-Symbolic theorem prover is trained on proof traces collected by proving automatically
generated query’s to K using sPyrolog2. Mrule and Mvar are initialized randomly and with GloVe
embeddings [47], respectively, where m1 = 256 and m2 = 300. Since K is type-coerced (e.g.
Time, Location, . . . ), initializing the variables with pre-trained word embeddings helps capture
their semantics and improves the performance. The neural components of the theorem prover is
implemented in PyTorch [48] and the prover is built on top of sPyrolog.
User Study In order to assess CORGI’s performance, we ran a user study. We selected 10 goal-
type if-then-because commands from the dataset in Table 1 and used each as the prompt for a rea-
soning task. We had 28 participants in the study, 4 of which were experts closely familiar with
CORGI and its capabilities. The rest were undergraduate and graduate students with the majority
being in engineering or computer science fields and some that majored in business administration or
psychology. These users had never interacted with CORGI prior to the study (novice users). Each
person was issued the 10 reasoning tasks, taking on average 20 minutes to complete all 10.
Solving a reasoning task consists of participating in a dialog with CORGI as the system attempts to
complete a proof for the goal of the current task; see sample dialogs in Tab. 3. The task succeeds if
CORGI is able to use the answers provided by the participant to construct a reasoning chain (proof)
leading from the goal to the state and action . We collected 469 dialogues in our study.
The user study was run with the architecture shown in Fig. 1. We used the participant responses from
the study to run a few more experiments. We (1) Replace our theorem prover with an oracle prover
that selects the optimal rule at each proof step in Alg. 1 and (2) attempt to prove the goalwithout
using any participant responses (no-feedback). Tab. 2 shows the success rate in each setting.
Discussion In this section, we analyze the results from the study and provide examples of the 4
scenarios in Section 3.1 that we encountered. As hypothesized there, scenario A hardly occurred.
We did encounter scenario B, however. The study’s dialogs show that some users provided means
of sensing the goal rather than the cause of the goal . For example, for the reasoning task “If there
are thunderstorms in the forecast within a few hours then remind me to close the windows because
I want to keep my home dry”, in response to the system’s prompt “How do I know if ‘I keep my
2https://github.com/leonweber/spyrolog
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home dry’?” a user responded “if the floor is not wet” as opposed to an answer such as “if the
windows are closed”. Moreover, some users did not pay attention to the context of the reasoning
task. For example, another user responded to the above prompt (same reasoning task) with “if the
temperature is above 80”! Overall, we noticed that CORGI’s ability to successfully reason about an
if-then-because statement was heavily dependent on whether the user knew how to give the system
what it needed, and not necessarily what it asked for; see Table 3 for an example. As it can be
seen in Table 2, expert users are able to more effectively provide answers that complete CORGI’s
reasoning chain, likely because they know that regardless of what CORGI asks, the object of the
dialog is to connect the because goal back to the knowledge base in some series of if-then rules
(goal /sub-goalpath in Sec.3.1). Therefore, one interesting future direction is to develop a dynamic
context-dependent Natural Language Generation method for asking more effective questions.
We would like to emphasize that although it seems to us, humans, that the previous example requires
very simple background knowledge that likely exists in SOTA large commonsense knowledge graphs
such as ConcepNet3, ATOMIC4 or COMET [12], this is not the case (verifiable by querying them
online). For example, for queries such as “the windows are closed”, COMET-ConceptNet gener-
ative model5 returns knowledge about blocking the sun, and COMET-ATOMIC generative model6
returns knowledge about keeping the house warm or avoiding to get hot; which while being correct,
is not applicable in this context. For “my home is dry”, both COMET-ConceptNet and COMET-
ATOMIC generative models return knowledge about house cleaning or house comfort. On the other
hand, the fact that 40% of the novice users in our study were able to help CORGI reason about this
example with responses such as “If I close the windows” to CORGI’s prompt, is an interesting result.
This tells us that conversational interactions with humans could pave the way for commonsense rea-
soning and enable computers to extract just-in-time commonsense knowledge, which would likely
either not exist in large knowledge bases or be irrelevant in the context of the particular reasoning
task. Lastly, we re-iterate that as conversational agents (such as Siri and Alexa) enter people’s lives,
leveraging conversational interactions for learning has become a more realistic opportunity than ever
before.
In order to address scenario C.1, the conversational prompts of CORGI ask for specific small pieces
of knowledge that can be easily parsed into a predicate and a set of arguments. However, some
users in our study tried to provide additional details, which challenged CORGI’s natural language
understanding. For example, for the reasoning task “If I receive an email about water shut off then
remind me about it a day before because I want to make sure I have access to water when I need
it.”, in response to the system’s prompt “How do I know if ‘I have access to water when I need it.’?”
one user responded “If I am reminded about a water shut off I can fill bottles”. This is a successful
knowledge transfer. However, the parser expected this to be broken down into two steps. If this user
responded to the prompt with “If I fill bottles” first, CORGI would have asked “How do I know if
‘I fill bottles’?” and if the user then responded “if I am reminded about a water shut off” CORGI
would have succeeded. The success from such conversational interactions are not reflected in the
overall performance mainly due to the limitations of natural language understanding.
Table 2 evaluates the effectiveness of conversational interactions for proving compared to the no-
feedback model. The 0% success rate there reflects the incompleteness of K. The improvement in
task success rate between the no-feedback case and the other rows indicates that when it is possible
for users to contribute useful common-sense knowledge to the system, performance improves. The
users contributed a total number of 96 rules to our knowledge base, 31 of which were unique rules.
Scenario C.2 occurs when there is variation in the user’s natural language statement and is addressed
with our neuro-symbolic theorem prover. Rows 2-3 in Table 2 evaluate our theorem prover (soft
unification). Having access to the optimal rule for unification does still better, but the task success
rate is not 100%, mainly due to the limitations of natural language understanding explained earlier.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a benchmark task for commonsense reasoning that aims at uncovering
unspoken intents that humans can easily uncover in a given statement by making presumptions
supported by their common sense. In order to solve this task, we propose CORGI (COmmon-sense
3http://conceptnet.io/
4https://mosaickg.apps.allenai.org/kg_atomic
5https://mosaickg.apps.allenai.org/comet_conceptnet
6https://mosaickg.apps.allenai.org/comet_atomic
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ReasoninG by Instruction) which is a neuro-symbolic theorem prover and performs commonsense
reasoning by initiating a conversation with a user. CORGI has access to a small knowledge base of
commonsense facts and completes it through time as she interacts with the user. We further conduct a
user study that indicates the possibility of using conversational interactions with humans for evoking
commonsense knowledge and verifies the effectiveness of our proposed theorem prover.
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Appendix
Data Collection
Data collection was done in two stages. In the first stage, we collected if-then-because commands
from humans subjects. In the second stage, a team of annotators annotated the data with common-
sense presumptions. Below we explain the details of the data collection and annotation process.
In the data collection stage, we asked a pool of human subjects to write commands that follow the
general format: if 〈 state holds 〉 then 〈 perform action 〉 because 〈 i want to achieve goal 〉. The
subjects were given the following instructions at the time of data collection:
“ Imagine the two following scenarios:
Scenario 1: Imagine you had a personal assistant that has access to your email, calendar, alarm,
weather and navigation apps, what are the tasks you would like the assistant to perform for your
day-to-day life? And why?
Scenario 2: Now imagine you have an assistant/friend that can understand anything. What would
you like that assistant/friend to do for you?
Our goal is to collect data in the format “If . . . . then . . . . because . . . .” ”
After the data was collected, a team of annotators annotated the commands with additional presump-
tions that the human subjects have left unspoken. These presumptions were either in the if -clause
and/or the then-clause and examples of them are shown in Tables 1 and 4
Table 4: Example if-then-because commands in the data and their annotations. Annotations are
tuples of (index, missing text) where index shows the starting word index of where the missing text
should be in the command. Index starts at 0 and is calculated for the original utterance.
Utterance Annotation
If the temperature ( ·
↓
) is above 30 degrees ( ·
↓
)
then remind me to put the leftovers from last night into the fridge
because I want the leftovers to stay fresh
(2, inside)
(7, Celsius)
If it snows ( ·
↓
) tonight ( ·
↓
)
then wake me up early
because I want to arrive to work early
(3, more than two inches)
(4, and it is a working day)
If it’s going to rain in the afternoon ( ·
↓
)
then remind me to bring an umbrella ( ·
↓
)
because I want to stay dry
(8, when I am outside)
(15, before I leave the house)
Logic Templates
As explained in the main text, we uncovered 5 different logic templates, that reflect humans’ reason-
ing, from the data after data collection. The templates are listed in Table 5. In what follows, we will
explain each template in detail using the examples of each template listed in Tab. 5.
In the blue template (Template 1), the state results in a “bad state” that causes the not of the goal.
The speaker asks for the action in order to avoid the bad state and achieve the goal . For instance,
consider the example for the blue template in Table 5. The stateof snowing a lot at night, will
result in a bad state of traffic slowdowns which in turn causes the speaker to be late for work. In
order to overcome this bad state. The speaker would like to take the action , waking up earlier, to
account for the possible slowdowns cause by snow and get to work on time.
In the orange template (Template 2), performing the actionwhen the state holds allows the
speaker to achieve the goal and not performing the actionwhen the stateholds prevents the
speaker from achieving the goal . For instance, in the example for the orange template in Table 5
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Table 5: Different reasoning templates of the statements that we uncovered, presumably reflecting
how humans logically reason. ∧, ¬, :− indicate logical and, negation, and implication, respectively.
action h is an action that is hidden in the main utterance and action (state ) indicates performing
the action when the state holds.
Logic template Example Count
1.
(¬(goal ) :− state )∧
(goal :− action (state ))
If it snows tonight
then wake me up early
because I want to arrive to work on time
65
2.
(goal :− action (state ))∧
(¬(goal ) :− ¬(action (state )))
If I am walking to a meeting
then remind me who else is there
because I want to be prepared for the meeting
50
3.
(goal :− action h)∧
(action h :− action (state ))
If we are approaching Fall
then remind me to buy flower bulbs
because I want to make sure I have a pretty Spring garden.
17
4.
(goal :− state )∧
(¬(goal ) :− action (state ))
If I am at the grocery store but I have a trip coming up in the next week
then remind me not to buy perishables
because they will go bad while I am away
5
5. other
If tomorrow is a holiday
then ask me if I want to disable or change my alarms
because I don’t want to wake up early if I don’t need to go to work early.
23
the speaker would like to know who the attendees of a meeting are when the speaker is walking to
that meeting so that the speaker is prepared for the meeting and that if the speaker is not reminded
of this, he/she will not be able to properly prepare for the meeting.
In the green template (Template 3), performing the actionwhen the state holds allows the speaker
to take a hidden action that enables him/her to achieve the desired goal . For example, if the
speaker is reminded to buy flower bulbs close to the Fall season, he/she will buy and plant the
flowers (hidden action s) that allows the speaker to have a pretty spring garden.
In the purple template (Template 4), the goal that the speaker has stated is actually a goal that they
want to avoid. In this case, the state causes the speaker’s goal , but the speaker would like to take
the actionwhen the state holds to achieve the opposite of the goal . For the example in Tab. 1, if
the speaker has a trip coming up and he/she buys perishables the perishables would go bad. In order
for this not to happen, the speaker would like to be reminded not to buy perishables to avoid them
going bad while he/she is away.
The rest of the statements are categorized under the “other” category. The majority of these state-
ments contain conjunction in their state and are a mix of the above templates. A reasoning engine
could potentially benefit from these logic templates when performing reasoning. We provide more
detail about this in the Extended Discussion section in the Appendix.
Prolog Background
Prolog [38] is a declarative logic programming language. A Prolog program consists of a set of
predicates. A predicate has a name (functor) and N ≥ 0 arguments. N is referred to as the arity
of the predicate. A predicate with functor name F and arity N is represented as F (T1, . . . , TN)
where Ti’s, for i ∈ [1, N ], are the arguments that are arbitrary Prolog terms. A Prolog term is
either an atom, a variable or a compound term (a predicate with arguments). A variable starts with
a capital letter (e.g., Time) and atoms start with small letters (e.g. monday). A predicate defines
a relationship between its arguments. For example, isBefore(monday, tuesday) indicates that the
relationship between Monday and Tuesday is that, the former is before the latter.
A predicate is defined by a set of clauses. A clause is either a Prolog fact or a Prolog rule. A Prolog
rule is denoted with Head :− Body., where the Head is a predicate, the Body is a conjunction (∧) of
predicates, :− is logical implication, and period indicates the end of the clause. The previous rule is
an if-then statement that reads “if the Body holds then the Head holds”. A fact is a rule whose body
always holds, and is indicated by Head. , which is equivalent to Head :− true. Rows 1-4 in Table 6
are rules and rows 5-8 are facts.
Prolog can be used to logically “prove” whether a specific query holds or not (For example, to
prove that isAfter(wednesday,thursday)? is false or that status(i, dry, tuesday)? is true using the
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status(i, dry, tuesday)
status(Person1=i, dry, Date1=tuesday)
isInside(Person1=i, Building1, Date1=tuesday)
isInside(i, home, tuesday)
building(Building1)
building(home)
Figure 3: Sample simplified proof tree for query status(i, dry, tuesday). dashed edges show suc-
cessful unification, orange nodes show the head of the rule or fact that is retrieved by the unification
operator in each step and green nodes show the query in each proof step. This proof tree is obtained
using the Prolog program orK shown in Tab. 6. In the first step, unification goes through all the rules
and facts in the table and retrieves rule number 2 whose head unifies with the query. This is because
the query and the rule head’s functor name is status and they both have 3 arguments. Moreover,
the arguments all match since Person1 grounds to atom i, grounded atom dry matches in both and
variable Date1 grounds to tuesday. In the next step, the proof iterates through the predicates in the
rule’s body, which are isInside(i, Building1, tuesday) and building(Building1), to recursively prove
them one by one using the same strategy. Each of the predicates in the body become the new query
to prove and proof succeeds if all the predicates in the body are proved. Note that once the variables
are grounded in the head of the rule they are also grounded in the rule’s body.
Program in Table 6). The proof is performed through backward chaining, which is a backtracking
algorithm that usually employs a depth-first search strategy implemented recursively. In each step
of the recursion, the input is a query (goal) to prove and the output is the proof’s success/failure. in
order to prove a query, a rule or fact whose head unifies with the query is retrieved from the Prolog
program. The proof continues recursively for each predicate in the body of the retrieved rule and
succeeds if all the statements in the body of a rule are true. The base case (leaf) is when a fact is
retrieved from the program.
At the heart of backward chaining is the unification operator, which matches the query with a rule’s
head. Unification first checks if the functor of the query is the same as the functor of the rule head.
If they are the same, unification checks the arguments. If the number of arguments or the arity of
the predicates do not match unification fails. Otherwise it iterates through the arguments. For each
argument pair, if both are grounded atoms unification succeeds if they are exactly the same grounded
atoms. If one is a variable and the other is a grounded atom, unification grounds the variable to the
atom and succeeds. If both are variables unification succeeds without any variable grounding. The
backwards chaining algorithm and the unification operator is depicted in Figure 3.
Parsing
The goal of our parser is to extract the state , action and goal from the input utterance and convert
them to their logical forms S(X), A(Y ), and G(Z), respectively. The parser is built using Spacy
[49]. We implement a relation extraction method that uses Spacy’s built-in dependency parser. The
language model that we used is the en_coref_lg−3.0.0 released by Hugging face7. The predicate
name is typically the sentence verb or the sentence root. The predicate’s arguments are the subject,
objects, named entities and noun chunks extracted by Spacy. The output of the relation extractor
is matched against the knowledge base through rule-based mechanisms including string matching
to decide weather the parsed logical form exists in the knowledge base. If a match is found, the
parser re-orders the arguments to match the order of the arguments of the predicate retrieved from
the knowledge base. This re-ordering is done through a type coercion method. In order to do type
coercion, we use the types released by Allen AI in the Aristo tuple KB v1.03 Mar 2017 Release [50]
and have added more entries to it to cover more nouns. The released types file is a dictionary that
maps different nouns to their types. For example, doctor is of type person and Tuesday is of type
7https://github.com/huggingface/neuralcoref-models/releases/download/en_coref_lg-
3.0.0/en_coref_lg-3.0.0.tar.gz
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Algorithm 1 Neuro-Symbolic Theorem Prover
Input: goalG(Z), Mrule,Mvar, Model parameters, threshold T1, T2, k
Output: Proof P
r0 ← 0 ⊲ 0 is a vector of 0s
P = PROVE(G(Z), r0, [])
function PROVE(Q, rt, stack)
embedQ using the character RNN to obtain qt
input qt and rt to the model and compute rt+1 (Equation (2))
compute ct (Equation (2))
{R1 . . . Rk} ← FromM rule retrieve k entries corresponding to the top k entries of rt+1
for i ∈ [0, k] do
SU ← SOFT_UNIFY(Q, head(Ri))
if SU == False then
continue to i+ 1
else
if ct > T2 then
return stack
add Ri to stack
PROVE(Body(Ri), rt+1, stack) ⊲ Prove the body of R
i
return stack
function SOFT_UNIFY(G, H)
if arity(G) 6= arity(H) then
return False
UseMvar to compute cosine similarity Si for all corresponding variable pairs in G andH
if Si > T1 ∀ i ∈ [0, arity(G)] then
return True
else
return False
date. If no match is found, the parsed predicate will be kept as is and CORGI tries to evoke relevant
rules conversationally from humans in the user feedback loop in Figure 1.
We would like to note that we refrained from using a grammar parser, particularly because we want
to enable open-domain discussions with the users and save the time required for them to learn the
system’s language. As a result, the system will learn to adapt to the user’s language over time
since the background knowledge will be accumulated through user interactions, therefore it will be
adapted to that user. A negative effect, however, is that if the parser makes a mistake, error will
propagate onto the system’s future knowledge. This is an interesting future direction that we are
planning to address.
Inference
The inference algorithm for our proposed neuro-symbolic theorem prover is given in Alg. 1. In each
step t of the proof, given a queryQ, we calculate qt and rt from the trained model to compute rt+1.
Next, we choose k entries ofMrule corresponding to the top k entries of rt+1 as candidates for the
next proof trace. k is set to 5 and is a tuning parameter. For each rule in the top k rules, we attempt
to do variable/argument unification by computing the cosine similarity between the arguments of Q
and the arguments of the rule’s head. If all the corresponding pair of arguments in Q and the rule’s
head have a similarity higher than threshold, T1 = 0.9, unification succeeds, otherwise it fails. If
unification succeeds, we move to prove the body of that rule. If not, we move to the next rule.
Extended Discussion
Table 7 shows the performance breakdown with respect to the logic templates in Table 5. Currently,
CORGI uses a general theorem prover that can prove all the templates. The large variation in per-
formance indicates that taking into account the different templates would improve the performance.
For example, the low performance on the green template is expected, since CORGI currently does
not support the extraction of a hidden action from the user, and interactions only support extraction
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Table 6: Examples of the commonsense rules and facts in K
1
isEarlierThan(Time1,Time2) :- isBefore(Time1,Time3),
isEarlierThan(Time3,Time2).
2
status(Person1, dry, Date1) :- isInside(Person1, Building1, Date1),
building(Building1).
3
status(Person1, dry, Date1) :- weatherBad(Date1, _),
carry(Person1, umbrella, Date1),
isOutside(Person1, Date1).
4 notify(Person1, corgi, Action1) :- email(Person1, Action1).
5 isBefore(monday, tuesday).
6 has(house, window).
7 isInside(i, home, tuesday).
8 building(home).
of missing goal s. This interesting observation indicates that, even within the same benchmark, we
might need to develop several reasoning strategies to solve reasoning problems. Therefore, even
if CORGI adapts a general theorem prover, accounting for logic templates in the conversational
knowledge extraction component would allow it to achieve better performance on other templates.
Table 7: Number of successful reasoning tasks vs number of attempts under different scenarios. In
CORGI’s Oracle unification, soft unification is 100% accurate. LT stands for Logic Template and
LTi refers to template i in Table 5.
CORGI LT1 LT2 LT3 LT5
Oracle Unification 24% 38% 11% 0%
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